Book : Military Innovation In The Interwar Period - Murray,.

-Titulo Original : Military Innovation In The Interwar Period

-Fabricante :

Cambridge University Press

-Descripcion Original:

This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. Review Alan Beyerchens essay on German, British, and American work on radar is alone worth the price of the book and is a splendid demonstration of how a cultural and scientific historian can make a major contribution to military history. The description of how culture, organization, and strategic predicament shape a militarys reception of a new technology is simply brilliant. Foreign AffairsMilitary Innovation in the Interwar Period offers detailed insights into how to proceed with todays revolution in militray affairs. Those who find themselves today in the same position as Moffett, Towers, Liddell Hart, and Dowding did seventy years ago will want to study this book very closely. E.G.Hoffman, Naval War College ReviewThis volume should make a big impact on American military academies and staff colleges, and would also make a good graduate course reader for students who have a reasonable foundation in the otherwise daunting historiography. Brian Bond, The International History Review Book Description A study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s. From the Back Cover In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the six major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operational performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organization, and styles of operations.